It does make me wonder: why are aircraft takeoffs and landings not recorded more often, with higher quality cameras and more angles? If I can watch an NFL replay in 4k a few seconds after the ball is snapped, why not record (and overwrite) all flights that take off and land at every airport?
Like a dash cam, they can save the footage only if there is a problem. Surely that would be much better than splicing together many third party camera recordings.
> Ground observers reported the aircraft had been delayed for about two hours for work on the left hand engine (engine #1), the engine #1 separated during the takeoff run, the center engine emitted streaks of flames, the aircraft impacted a UPS warehouse and ploughed through other facilities before coming to rest in a large plume of fire and smoke.
PPRuNe[1] is another good one. Just be aware that all of these sites have a mixture of commentary by professionals in the air transport industry, amateur enthusiasts, and random bystanders.
Best advice is always to wait for authoritative statements.
Oh woah, very insightful discussion thread you found there.
So the tl'dr is: the leading very preliminary theory is that the MD-11's left engine fell off the wing just like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191 (a DC-10, the immediate predecessor of the MD-11) which was caused by maintenance errors weakening the pylon structure holding the engine.
The parallels with AA Flight 191 are striking. In THAT accident it was found [1]:
1) improper maintenance—American Airlines had used a forklift shortcut to remove the engine and pylon together, rather than following McDonnell Douglas’s prescribed method
2) The detachment tore away part of the wing’s leading edge, rupturing hydraulic lines and severing electrical power to key systems, including the slat-position indicator and stall warning (stick shaker).
3) The pilots followed the standard engine-out procedure and reduced airspeed to V₂, which caused the aircraft to stall and roll uncontrollably left. This procedure was later found out to be incorrect.
Defective maintenance practices, inadequate oversight, vulnerabilities in DC-10 design, and unsafe training procedures combined to cause the crash, killing all 273 people on board and leading to sweeping reforms in airline maintenance and certification standards.
And just to add for those that aren't pilots: When they say "reduced airspeed to V2" that doesn't mean reducing engine power, it means pointing the nose higher while thrust remains at the maximum permissable setting. You're loosing speed but climbing faster.
This can happen if you accelerated past V2 (V2+20 is normal) before the engine failure and then after the failure you slow down to V2 to get the best climb angle on a single engine plus some safety margins above stall etc.
(asked earnestly out of lack of familiarity with this field) Are maintenance/certification standards distinct between passenger and cargo carriers?
It's hard for me to tell if this suggests a step backwards in application of the reforms instigated after AA191 or that those reforms were never copied over to cargo aviation.
Yes but mostly related to purpose specific things: passenger carriers have additional safety checks for cabin things like seats, oxygen and evacuation systems. Cargo carriers have additional safety checks for things like cargo restraint and decompression systems.
Furthermore (and I don't know if this is related to the cause of this crash), cargo jets tend to be older/refurbished passenger planes that have outlived their useful lives flying passengers.
To expand on #2, the loss of hydraulic pressure also caused the uncommanded retraction of the leading edge slats on the left wing, which was found by the NTSB to be part of the probable cause. Full report is here (PDF): https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/...
(I do not mean to imply that this exact slat retraction is necessarily relevant in the Louisville crash, however - I believe aircraft since AA191 are designed to maintain their wing configuration after loss of hydraulic pressure.)
What strikes me as odd is that this looks like the "naked" engine, without the cowling/nacelle that usually surrounds it? Anyway, if an engine departs the aircraft shortly after (last-minute) maintenance was performed on it, that's indeed suspicious...
The fan cowl and thrust reverser cowl are structurally fastened to the pylon/strut at the top, they only wrap around the engine, and are fastened to themselves at the bottom using latches. The strut considered part of the airframe structure. The inlet cowl is bolted directly to the engine, I saw in a picture that it was found approximately mid-field on the airport property.
The engine that fell off (!) had been worked on for two hours at Louisville, KY immediately before takeoff. Occam's Razor suggests that whatever they did right there is to blame.
> Occam's Razor suggests that whatever they did right there is to blame.
Ordinarily yes, but in this case there are reports that the plane underwent a "heavy maintenance check" from Sep 3 to Oct 18, which may have included engine removal and overhaul (source: pprune.org, from a poster who's not given to flights of fancy.)
In the Reddit /r/aviation thread, there are people who spotted that specific plane at San Antonio International airport since it was apparently being serviced at a major service facility there. So yes to major service potentially at issue, and no to international work being at fault.
Maybe the maintenance is better in the other country.
Either way, to say it's "likely relevant" is a huge leap. We have no idea what caused the crash - it could be a million things and likely some combintation of them.
I wonder what the FAA does organizationally that lets it function properly to find cause. It must be highly tempting to blame things on the foreigners and stuff like that. The Air India crash had a lot of that going on.
The 737 Max crashes were also so frequently explained by online commenters as because of “outsourced software engineers” and so on.
But the FAA/NTSB always comes through with fact finding despite the immense political pressure to find these facile explanations. Organizationally, someone once designed these things well, and subsequently it has been preserved so well.
When I see so many American institutions turned to partisan causes through an escalation of “well, they’re doing it” it’s pretty wild that this org remains trustworthy. Wild.
> TDLR 10-20 years ago, the US started allowing maintenance of domestic planes in foreign countries, outside the reach of the FAA’s inspections
Foreign Repair Stations date back to the 90s [1], the thing is they need to be supervised by an FAA Certified Mechanic. Inspection of these was already a hot issue in the early '00s... No one gave a fuck, it was all about saving costs for a very long time.
The linked 2007 report's second page (!) already leads with this:
> Since 2001, eight commercial air carriers have gone through bankruptcy and one has ceased operations. Fuel prices remain high, and this makes cost control a key factor in both the sustained profitability and overall survival of an airline.
IMHO, this is a perfect example why the government needs to regulate prices in safety-critical industries. The "race to the bottom" must be prevented - sorry, flying NYC-SFO for 70$, that's not sustainable.
>this is a perfect example why the government needs to regulate prices in safety-critical industries.
Aviation is one of the most regulated industries to the point where I've heard multiple aircraft maintenance people who don't know each other make quips to the tune of "we only cut the stupid corners because cutting the smart ones is illegal".
I'm not saying it should be less regulated but considering that the aircraft was maintained recently I wouldn't be surprised if some dumb "well you didn't say we couldn't do it" thing that isn't technically disallowed but should be covered under some broader "don't be stupid" rule was ultimately a causative factor.
The government should just set a higher safety standard and let the companies figure out the costs. Setting a floor price without proper regulation == companies doing the same bagging more $$ -- To be very frank, I would do that if I were the chairman of such companies -- either I do that or I'm madmen getting voted out of my position next year.
> The government should just set a higher safety standard and let the companies figure out the costs.
The problem is, it doesn't work out that way. We lost enough people to that madness - as soon as hundreds, if not thousands (see 9/11) of lives are at stake, IMHO the effort to ensure compliance with standards is so massive, the government could (and should...) do the damn job itself.
> IMHO, this is a perfect example why the government needs to regulate prices in safety-critical industries. The "race to the bottom" must be prevented - sorry, flying NYC-SFO for 70$, that's not sustainable.
Are you saying higher prices would lead to better safety?
If so, I think it's optimistic to assume that would be the result, rather than just more profits.
I'm all for tighter regulations and enforcement on safety and maintenance, though.
Yes, admittedly, there could still be a reason why the GP's opinion is right, even though the numbers don't back it up. It's hard to argue that deregulation made flying safer, because as you say there were a ton of other factors in play.
However, it's impossible to argue that deregulation made flying more dangerous, as the GP believes, simply because flying didn't become more dangerous. Sure, maybe we'd be even safer in the air if price deregulation hadn't happened, but that requires an impressive amount of handwaving. Overall, the tradeoff seems to have worked out incredibly well for everyone. The only people who are really in a position to object would be climate researchers.
> Are you saying higher prices would lead to better safety?
Higher prices and regulations.
With no floor on pricing, there will always be enough greedy executives who are willing to cut corners to make money in a ruthlessly competitive environment, fully knowing that it is very hard to prosecute a C-level executive personally.
The other possible result will be that eventually the market "agrees upon" a minimum price floor while being in compliance to regulations - but that usually means that the company will be as bare-stripped of assets and reserves as possible, which means in turn that the slightest external shock can (and will) send not just one but multiple companies crashing down hard. We've seen this with Covid - an economy that has optimized itself for decades on running as lean as possible is very sensitive to all sorts of external interruptions. Of course, that's not directly relevant to safety... but indirectly it is, as the inevitable result of that is an oligo-, duo- or monopoly and then, we've seen with Boeing where that ends, incentives aligned too much to cut corners.
I kiiinda see where you're coming from but I guess I just don't buy it, TBH.
I think greed is what's causing cut corners.
You mention Boeing, and they were quite healthily profitable during the entire time they were cutting corners on the 737 MAX. Airbus wasn't an existential threat. It still isn't, in fact, even after all the fallout.
The damage on the ground is scary to look at. I think the only silver lining here is that it was "just" a sparser industrial area and there weren't any homes. I'm really curious about what the investigation will reveal in a few months. This doesn't look like a "regular" engine fire from a bird strike or so, you would normally expect the flames to come out the back and not over the wing. And at least in theory the MD-11 should be flyable with just two engines, although flames on a wing is probably "really really bad" just by itself already. Too early to speculate about what happened though.
Zoning guidance generally prohibits land use near an airport that has a high density of people, precisely to limit casualties during an event like this. Industrial would be permitted while residential and commercial use is not.
Scarily there are communities that have ignored such logic and permitted dense residential development right next to an airport.
Jets are also simply too loud for homes under the takeoff path in standard use. There’s what amounts to a ghost town next to LAX due to this and the history of the airport.
Burbank Airport has quiet hours and has left a bunch of commercially zoned area under that takeoff path.
I’m in Atlanta now and they bought up a lot of land around the airport when redeveloping it and do similar zoning tricks for the buffer. One of the buffer zones is the Porsche Experience. It’s loud as heck when you’re on the part of the track closest but not bad where the corporate HQ and paddock is
Fresno here. If this had happened at FAT (FYI now? We have dumb names) the casualties would've easily hit three digits from initial impact, and then whatever else burned afterwards because CA==tinderbox.
It's amazing that towns don't see this sort of thing and think "huh maybe it's not a good idea to put apartments right on top of an airport", but I guess they don't. Longmont is in trouble with the FAA because they OKed a bunch of apartments right at the end of Vance Brand that would be right in the path of aircraft struggling to gain altitude out of the airport. Naturally there's a vocal contingent of people around here that think this is the airport's problem and not the town or greedy developers, and that all the airports (except DIA) should be shut down.
None? Nobody puts airports inside city centers and metro areas don’t just have dense urban housing. The common solution in many land strapped cities is for airports to rout aircraft over water often by building airports on reclaimed land.
What generally gets areas in trouble is locations that used to be a good get worse as aircraft get larger and the surroundings get built up. The solution is to send larger airplanes to a new airport, but it’s not free and there’s no clear line when things get unacceptably dangerous.
(This is widely considered a misfeature of San Jose - it limits the height of buildings in downtown San Jose to 10 stories because the downtown is directly under the flight path of arriving flights, it limits runway length and airport expansion, and it means that planes and their noise fly directly over key tourist attractions like the Rose Garden and Convention Center. If we ever had a major plane crash like this one in San Jose it would be a disaster, because the airport is bounded by 101 on the north, 880 on the south, the arriving flight path goes right over downtown, and the departing flight path goes right over Levi's Stadium, Great America, and several office buildings.)
The Las Vegas Airport is very close to the strip, surrounded by residential neighborhoods and hotels about 1/4 - 1/2 mile from the airport, and UNLV university is about 1000 feet in a straight line from one of the runways.
There’s roughly a mile of roads, green spaces, and river between the airport and downtown San Jose which an absolutely identical accident would impact. It’s not very wide, but pilots aren’t going to aim for buildings if they can help it.
So while downtown being in the flight path is a risk there was some method to the madness which caused that alignment.
San Diego's airport, on the other hand, has the a bustling restaurant district, an interstate with frequent bumper-to-bumper traffic, and a dense residential neighborhood all within a mile off one end of the runway -- and a popular shopping area, an elementary school, and a high school within just over a mile from the other end.
In addition, the terrain rises in both directions (so sharply on one side that planes can't use ILS when landing from that direction).
It's hard to project growth. Things build right up to the limit of the airport for convenient access, then the area grows and the airport needs to grow - and what do you do? Seattle-Tacoma is critically undersized for the traffic it gets and has been struggling with the fact that there's physically nowhere to expand to.
Zoning is one option to direct growth, but you can move airports. Chicago is right next to a Great Lake and there’s relatively shallow areas ready to be reclaimed etc.
Obviously you’re better off making such decisions early rather than building a huge airport only to abandon it. Thus it’s called urban planning not urban triage.
The Ohio River is a mile wide at Louisville, but that still doesn't wide enough to classify it "large body of water", especially because it is a river that moves relatively quick for its width and then hits falls/rapids just downstream of Louisville.
But also there's a lot of urban and suburban development you'd have to displace to even consider moving the airport near the Ohio River for most miles both up and down stream of Louisville.
Tradeoffs. Physical land under the airport is lost either way, but land near the old airport becomes more useful where the river itself couldn’t have buildings in either situation. Thus moving it near a river or other large body of water is a long term net gain.
As to a crash, ditching into an industrial area isn’t significantly worse for the passengers than ditching into a set of rapids, but the rapids are far better for the general public.
You’re correct, but at least LaGuardia airport generally has takeoffs over water.
LaGuardia aircraft landings may happen over dense apartment buildings, but less likely for catastrophic damage (glide path, less fuel, engines are <10% throttle, etc)
> And at least in theory the MD-11 should be flyable with just two engines
Flying with two engines and taking off without an engine in a loaded aircraft are two very different things. A lot more thrust is needed during takeoff than after.
Taking off with one engine inoperative (on a multi-engine aircraft, obviously - you aren't going to get anywhere with your only engine gone) is completely normal/within design parameters, albeit undesirable.
In fact, it being normal almost certainly contributed to the scale of this accident, since a single engine failure during the takeoff roll isn't considered enough of an emergency to reject the takeoff at high speed (past a certain speed, you only abort if the aircraft is literally unflyable - for everything else, you take the aircraft & emergency into the air and figure it out there). The crew wouldn't have had any way to know that one of their engines had not simply failed, but was straight-up gone with their wing on fire to boot.
> The crew wouldn't have had any way to know that one of their engines had not simply failed, but was straight-up gone with their wing on fire to boot.
I don't know about the MD-11 itself, but other aircraft from that time period have sensors to detect and report overheat and fire in various parts of the aircraft, including engines and wings.
Well, there's a very big difference between "Engine fire: some of the combustion chamber's heat and flame has breached containment" and, say, "Engine fire: the engine has exploded, catastrophically damaging your wing which is now visibly on fire". However, both things are reported in the cockpit as ENG FIRE.
There's also a very big difference between "Engine failure: something has damaged or jammed enough components that the turbines are no longer spinning fast enough to produce thrust or drive the generators" and "Engine failure: the engine is no longer attached to the aircraft, which is why it is no longer producing thrust". However, both things are reported in the cockpit as ENG FAIL.
(Un)fortunately, cockpit warnings prioritise the what (so to speak) and not the how or why. On one hand, this makes decision-making a lot simpler for the crew, but on the other...well, in rare cases the lack of insight can exacerbate a disaster. Depending on when exactly the engine gave out, this poor crew might have been doomed either way, but they might have been able to minimise collateral damage if they knew just how badly crippled the aircraft was. And there was a very similar accident to this one (actually involving the predecessor of the MD-11, the DC-10), American Airlines 191 - one of the engines detached from the aircraft, damaging the leading edge of its wing in the process, causing that wing to stall when the crew slowed down below the stall speed of the damaged wing in a bid to climb. If they could have somehow known about the damage, the accident might have been avoided entirely as the crew might have known to keep their speed up.
> There's also a very big difference between "Engine failure: something has damaged or jammed enough components that the turbines are no longer spinning fast enough to produce thrust or drive the generators" and "Engine failure: the engine is no longer attached to the aircraft, which is why it is no longer producing thrust". However, both things are reported in the cockpit as ENG FAIL.
That's the biggest, the weight gone entirely unbalances the plane; if you knew exactly what happened you MIGHT be able to keep it level (and it seems they did for a bit) but eventually airspeed drops, it tips, and cartwheels (which is apparently what it did from the videos).
Deadweight or no-weight engine is a relatively negligible problem in terms of the weight-balance envelope.
Cut fuel & hydraulic lines near that engine (that affect the other engines/ apus) (or less likely structural or aerodynamic problems) is what's going to shift this from "engine failure" recoverable problem to a global nonrecoverable one.
The aircraft hit the roof of a UPS warehouse, barely clearing it before coming down in the parking lot/junkyard nearby. So when we see it turning over in its last seconds (like the trucker dash cam video), it only had one wing at that point.
During engine failure / fire situations, I would expect that pilots are likely to be too busy to have any time left over for peering at a video feed, trying to assess the state of the wing.
In emergencies, information overload tends to make things worse, not better.
Having cameras pointed at the engines/wings like rearview mirrors would be helpful. It does not add that much workload if you take a quick glance in the “mirror” and figure out what the problem exactly is.
And now we have technology that allows for cameras everywhere to give a better situational awareness across all critical aircraft surfaces and systems.
It is going to take a little bit of adjusting to, but it will help improve safety in a tremendous way.
This would need to be tested. There's a lot going on already during normal take-offs. Now you're in a situation where the engine fire alarm is going off, probably a few other alarms, you got so many messages on your display that it only shows the most urgent one, you're taking quick glances at 50 points in the cockpit already.
And how would the cameras even work? Are the pilots supposed to switch between multiple camera feeds, or do we install dozens of screens? And then what, they see lots of black smoke on one camera, does that really tell them that much more than the ENG FIRE alert blaring in the background?
Maybe this could help during stable flight, but in this situation, when the pilots were likely already overloaded and probably had only a few seconds to escape this situation - if it was possible at all - I can't imagine it being helpful.
You know how the tail camera works on the new planes? Something like that, which can be far away from the wings, but get the full picture. Am I saying it's the solution for everything? No. But after you go through the memory committed items during an emergency, you can take a look outside and be like "ah, I see better what the problem is".
If we don't try to see how it goes, we won't know if it is a good idea or not.
It'd certainly need more thought put into it than just showing the camera view from the entertainment system. Either just one camera on the tail pointed forwards, so you have one single camera that can show the whole plane, or two cameras in the front, one pointed at each wing. Two cameras is worse than one, but they are less likely to be affected by smoke or blood splatters or whatever. Maybe give each pilot one of the camera feeds. And you'd have to fit a dedicated screen for the video feed so pilots don't need to switch through screens in an emergency.
It'd take lots of testing and engineering. But especially in cases where you have multiple warnings going off I imagine that a quick view at an exterior camera can often give you a clearer/faster indication of the situation
its super weird to me this isn't a thing, and there's resistence to the idea. I mean, if they are already masters at glacing at 100000 differnent indicators and warning messages etc. and processing them at super speeds (they really do!) then i'd say a monitor with a bunch of buttons below it to switch feeds (maybe a little more elaborate, but not tooo...) would be helpful.
the problem might be getting trained and experienced pilots to adjust to it since they are already in a certain flow of habits and skills to apply in their job, but new pilots surely could learn it as they aren't so set on their ways yet and have the opportunity to build this new data into their skillset / habits.
Look, information overload is a real problem. Medical devices are an analogous industry in that in an emergency nurses and doctors are getting completely bombarded with alarm tones, flashing lights, noise, and also whatever is going on with the patient. There are standards in that industry governing how you alarm, what your alarm tones sound like, what colors you're supposed to use, how fast you're supposed to flash, and so on. And people still miss alarms because there are still a ton of them all going off at once.
People have an upper limit on their capacity to take in information, and that limit goes down when they are moving quickly to solve problems. Throwing more information at them in those moments increases the risk that they will take in the wrong information, disregard more important information, and make really bad decisions.
So no, it's not cut and dried like you're thinking.
The entire event was over in less than a minute, and during that time there’s only one thing pilots are working on: maintaining what little control they have, and gaining as much altitude as possible without loss of control.
This is consuming all mental processing, there are no spare cycles.
This wasn’t a salvageable situation by having more information after the engine separated. If a sensor could have provided a warning of engine failure well before V1, that would be helpful.
I expect the questions will focus on what information existed that should have resulted in aborting the takeoff. Not what information was needed to continue.
Okay. So you mean in general it would help in some cases. Not that in this case it would have helped.
> see UA1175
I'm familiar with the case you are mentioning. I'm also aware that they sent a jump seater to look at the engine. But did seeing the engine provide them with any actionable information? Did they fly the airplane differently than if they would have just seen the indications available in the cockpit?
Excellent. So in what cases does seeing the engine visually do help? So far we discussed UPS2976 and UA1175 where the presence or absence of the camera didn't change the outcome.
> Regarding UA1175, they had someone extra, but not all flights happen to have someone extra in the cockpit.
You are dancing around my question. What does the pilot do differently based on what they see? If you can't articulate a clear "pilot sees X they do Y, pilot sees Z they do Q" flow then what is the video good for?
in a sibling thread you say "There are countless situations where it can be helpful." But you haven't named even one of those countless situations yet.
They surely can and this has been done.
On one the flights that I took with Turkish Airlines they had a few video streams from different sides of the airplane. One was from the top of the tail and you could see the entire plane.
Now... not sure how much that is helpful in this kind of emergency, they really didn't have time to do much.
I'm not sure they usually have the views on screen in the cockpit in flight, even if available (and an old MD-11 freighter won't have the cameras in the first place). The picture of an A380 cockpit (on the ground) on Wikipedia does show the tail view on a screen, but its on the screen normally used for main instruments. With an A380 that had an uncontained engine failure causing various bits of havok (Qantas 32?) IIRC the passengers could see a fuel leak on the in flight entertainment screens, but they had to tell the crew as AFAIK they didn't have access to the view in the cockpit in flight.
I’m sure they knew there was an issue, but I don’t think the sensors can differentiate between “your engine is on fire, but if you can shut it down quickly, everything will be cool.” and “half your entire wing is on fire and your engine is pouring flame out the front/top instead of the back”
There are two fire detection loops for each engine.[1] Even if both fails (because they get shredded as you say it) the system will report an engine fire if the two loops fail within 5s of each other. (Or FIRE DET (1,2,3,or APU) FAIL, if they got shredded with more than 5s in between without any fire indications in between.)
The detection logic is implemented directly below the cockpit. So that unlikely to have shredded at the same time. But even if the detection logic would have died that would also result in a fire alarm. (as we learned from the March 31, 2002 Charlotte incident.)[2]
I don't know what the MD-11 would have had, again I didn't work on it. But the systems used for other aircraft would have reported an alarm based on what I saw in the video, at least they were designed to do that. The LRU receiving the sensor inputs wouldn't typically be in the wing and would be able to continue reporting the alarm condition even if the sensors fail. In fact, the lack of current from the sensor (for the systems I worked on) would have been enough to trigger the alarm if the sensor were completely eliminated.
Every multi-engine airliner is designed to be able to take off safely even if an engine fails at a critical moment. What might have happened in this case is that the mechanism of failure of one engine caused damaged or interfered with the operation of another engine (via smoke, debris, etc.), and taking off with two engines degraded is not part of the design criteria.
I do think 'engine fails' and 'engine has left the building' are two different categories of problems. Even if the rear engine was working I'm going to assume this craft would have crashed, probably just farther down range.
Some engine failures can't be contained within the cowling, like turbine disc rupture. Probably something like this happened where fragments punctured the surrounding wing structure and/or fuel tanks.
I specifically remember watching a flight test doing an aggressive takeoff and having the voiceover say that aircraft (two engine) need to have enough power to take off full with one engine. And so can take off very steeply empty with two engines. Would that not also be the case for these planes?
Yes, planes are designed to be able to take off with a lost engine. Usually this will extend the roll a bit because the speeds are different for engine out operations. This isn't the first MD-11 with an engine out take off, 5 years ago a FedEx MD-11 took off with a failure in the left engine[1]. Slightly different case, obviously, but it's certainly something that is accounted for when designing planes.
Yes, the takeoff roll will be longer, the climb will be much more shallow, but it is possible to take off with one out of two engines (and obviously also with two out of three). Of course, after successful takeoff, the plane should turn around and land as soon as possible.
In this case however, with the wing already on fire (the engine is below the wing, so flames coming out of it would be visible behind and under the wing, not in front), I'm afraid that even if they had managed to take off, the fuel tank would have exploded or burned through the wing before they would have had a chance to land. Actually, this looks similar to the 2000 Concorde crash...
That being said, depending on how you lose the engine it can really mess up the takeoff; AA191 was lost when an engine detached from the plane on takeoff and took out part of the wing and hydraulic system with it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191
All planes are definitely capable of taking off safely even if they lose an engine at the worst time. Whatever happened here, I would be shocked if lack of thrust in the 2 remaining engines was a significant factor unless someone really screwed up the load calculations and they were overweight for conditions.
Single engine planes (GA, and some military planes) don’t handle this condition well at all.
In fact, for awhile (maybe still the case), the #1 killer of skydivers was single engine failure on takeoff from the jump plane (and similar aircraft failures), not accidents ‘while skydiving’.
The ground damage in the recent North Philadelphia Airport crash was only due to a chartered jet, but it practically wiped out a residential city block.
I don’t know, that looks like a lot more than just a stall. There was a ton of flame that looked like it was coming out of the front or top of the engine, rather than just something shooting out the back.
I think you're looking at the left wing (number 1) engine; GP is talking about either the tail or right wing engine. (I think tail is number 2 on MD-11.) There's a brief explosion visible through the smoke at about 1-2 seconds in, to the right of the engine visibly on fire; that's probably what he's talking about.
Yup makes sense. Now seeing photos of the entire left engine on the ground by the runway and the implication that however it failed it might have damaged the tail engine.
The rotation already exacerbates the flow into that engine. Change in flow geometry gets more smoke in its way when it's already eating turbulent air.
We don't know if it just had a disruption or a full-blown stall, but give the way it made it to takeoff speed and then just gave out, stall seems likely.
I would say it does not, in fact, look like a compressor stall. It looks very much like an uncontained disassembly, presumably from fan blades that suffered a catastrophic failure and broke up in a way that exceeded the limits of the engine's containment.
Obviously impossible to tell from some cell phone type videos. Being struck by something is also possible. But it sure does look like an uncontained engine failure.
I would say it's easy to see the list of videos with no undue nonsense, the list is augmented as new footage is available, it contains more context on the accident (also augmented with subsequent information), and the local news deserves the traffic more than twitter
Every time I board a plane, I think what a crazy thing I am doing, but then I remember that I could be safe and snug in my house and still be in a plane crash.
I also lived not too far from that location, and unfortunately got a glimpse of the aircraft as it was spiraling down. The scene on the ground was pretty hellish.
Given an hour spent flying in a commercial US-flagged airliner or an hour spent in your living room, and you're (far) more likely to get hurt or die in your living room.
My guess would be that a lot of living room deaths are due to illness which would make the person unlikely to board a commercial flight, or other categories which certain individuals could reasonably exclude themselves from (drug overdose, suicide, amateur electrician work, etc.).
I doubt there's a good source of data, but I'd be very curious what the odds of dying in your living room per hour are if you exclude those categories and look at things like house fires, natural disasters, homicide, freak accidents (like planes falling on your house), etc.
Actual statistics: In 2023 there were 35.3 million commercial flights worldwide.[1] In that year, there were 66 accidents in commercial aviation worldwide, of which one fatal (9N-ANC).[2] This means that the chance of being in an accident was approx 1:535,000 (0.000187 %). The chance of getting into a fatal accident was 1:35,300,000 (0.000003 %). Per passenger the chance of fatality was approx 1:61,111,111 (0.00000164 %), with 72 fatalities among 4,400,000,000 total passengers.
In contrast, the United States saw 125,700 preventable deaths in the home in 2023.[3] The country had a population of 336,806,231 people back then.[4] This means a probability of approx 1:2,679 (0.037 %).
Per passenger mile is arguably not the best denominator. People choose planes because they are going long distances. Consider whether a better denominator would be per passenger trips. A 10,000 mi trip halfway across the world could have the same weight as a 2 mi trip to the grocery store.
Or per hour travelled.
By these metrics commercial flying isn't as safe as you think.
If I’m going somewhere in the continental US, my choices are to fly or drive. I’ll be traveling the same number of miles either way, so the relevant comparison is indeed per mile.
That doesn't explain anything. Specifically it doesn't explain why in our comparisons the destination is fixed. You could decide for this weekend trip we're going to budget a max of 3 hours on transportation. Should we take a three hour flight to a different state or should we drive for three hours to a closer destination?
rogerrogerr, I suspect that stat involves all deaths, not just to passengers.
The vast majority of deaths by train involve "trespassers", which is code for "dimwits who bypassed crossing gates and got smashed by the train that couldn't stop". Usually not even the train drivers are injured, much less the passengers.
But airplanes are very safe - perhaps mostly because it's hard for idiots to drive in front of them.
Yeah, but so are living rooms. And even when someone dies in the living room, it is most likely to be a hearth attack or other heath issue unrelated to the place.
All things being equal, I would assume that you are safer in an environment that's stationary and reasonably sturdy, rather than in an aluminum tube at 40,000 ft above ground? Ok, as they say, all things are rarely equal, of course people are more likely to die of old age or of various diseases at home rather than while traveling (simply because old and terminally ill people probably don't travel that much), but I would say that skews the statistics against the living room and should be discounted. And at home you can engage in various activities that you probably won't do while on an airplane (electrical repairs, cooking...), but if you get hurt while doing that, that's also not a fault of the living room per se...
That's just it though. You're safer strapped into a seat, doing nothing, than you are doing whatever it is you do at home.
Would you be safer in your living room doing nothing, strapped to a seat, never doing anything remotely hazardous (like walking around), vs the same in a tube in the sky? Yes, of course. But that's not what people actually DO in their living rooms!
The relevant bits here - deaths from all causes in the US are 22 micromorts per day. Lower in the article, airline travel is listed as 1 micromort per 1000 miles travelled.
Background risk of death from non-natural causes are listed as 1.6 per day; many of those non-natural causes do not exist in an airplane cabin (e.g. you probably aren't going to be murdered because no one has anything more effective than a plastic spork, you probably aren't going to kill yourself, you probably won't be hit by a car). So it seems reasonable to say that being inside an airliner cabin is safer than being outside of one.
Also, this is probably confounded by many super-old or super-sick people not choosing to fly - if you are in an airliner, you are probably healthier than the average person.
All causes deaths and living room deaths are not the same. Even if we count hearth attack in living room as living room death, we still must substract car crashed, bedroom deaths, hospitals deaths, garden deaths.
This is probably the worst way a plane could go down in terms of damage caused. Maximum effect in term of damage. Cargo plane apparently reached V1 (go/no go speed) on the runway, and suffered a catastrophic engine failure. They passed V1, so they knew they were going down. Engine was shedding large debris, including the housing (!!!) which is a shrapnel shield.
They were on fire just as they reached V1.
Plane was fully loaded with 38,000 LB of fuel for 12 hour flight to hawaii. Worst case scenario.
Pilots did the heroic thing - they tried to take off instead at 160 MPH to minimize collateral damage (highway and warehouses at the end of the runway) and crash and die somewhere else, instead of go beyond the runway at that speed. Accelerating a fully loaded jet plane at ground level beyond the runway has obvious consequences. They had one choice.
Instead, they clipped the UPS factory because they were so low, they tried to clear it but did not. Plane then hit the ground port wing down, shearing it off entirely, smearing a fireball of jet fuel across half a mile (not an exaggeration) before the plane flipped. Crew were likely dead by before this, footage shows the cockpit being slammed into the ground like a mousetrap by the flip once the port wing was gone and gravity took the starboard wing over.
Physics took over. Plane flipped and rolled upon loss of port wing, smearing a rolling fireball of the remaining fuel load from the starboard wing for another half a mile.
Louisville is now a firestorm as a result.
Respect to the flight crew; rest in peace, they made the best they could out of a really shitty scenario. They flew it all the way down.
It was around 250k gallons of fuel. Our CAD notes on the initial dispatch said 250k, one press briefing said 280k, and then it was changed to 220k which I think is the actual number.
Standard procedure at V1 is commit to the takeoff and diagnose the problem in-air. Much of your comment is pure speculation until flight data recorders come back, we have no idea what the crew was thinking or what issues they were even aware of.
No, and reverse trust is not included in the calculation for stopping distance for a failure below V1. You can stop from just below V1 with only the brakes, if that's not possible you're not allowed to start the takeoff. You would have to reduce weight until the numbers fit the runway.
After V1 you must be able to take off on only the remaining engines. If that's not possible you must reduce weight until it is possible or you're not allowed to start takeoff at all.
This is why in very warm weather and higher altitude airports (lower performance) sometimes cargo/luggage or even some passengers are left behind, while in colder weather all seats could be used.
It's a few blocks of fire. I was on Tanker 4565 standing by as a backfill for units on scene. It's no where near "All of Louisville", that's a ridiculous thing to say.
> they tried to take off instead of accelerate past the runway at ground level
Do runways have some sort of barrier between them and the next "important" thing. It seems like that would be prudent both for cases like this, and breaking failures following landings.
> Do runways have some sort of barrier between them and the next "important" thing. It seems like that would be prudent both for cases like this
Ha, Jeju Air Flight 2216 smashed into a barrier on the second landing attempt in Muan last year [0], and people commented "How could there be a barrier at the end of the runway, so obviously stupid, irresponsible", etc.
Now a plane does not smash into a barrier at the end of the runway and people suggest putting barriers at the end of the runway.
Don't mean to attack parent post, but may I suggest that
a) hordes of experts have thought long and hard about these issues, and it is unlikely that you can encounter this for the first time as a lay person and come up with a solution that has eluded the best engineers for decades ("why don't they attach a parachute to the plane?"), and
b) we are very close to an optimum in commercial aviation, and there are few if any unambiguous ("Pareto") improvements, but rather just tradeoffs. For example: You leave cockpit doors open, terrorists come in and commandeer the plane to turn it into a weapon. You lock the cockpit doors closed, and suicidal pilots lock out the rest of the crew and commandeer the plane to turn it into a weapon of mass-murder-suicide.
One improvement is a bed of concrete at the end of the runway that will catch the wheels and slow an airplane down to a stop. Pretty much everyone agrees it’s a good idea but it’s not always possible due to space needs or cost. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engineered_materials_arrestor_...
If you're designing a new airport, sure, you can have runways with ample safety margins and generous overrun areas at the end of the runways. If you want to make an existing airport safer, and you can't buy up and demolish buildings around it, using EMAS is actually a cost-effective safety improvement.
The ramp will need to be very long and very high in order to absorb the momentum of a fully loaded widebody jet. Not something that you'd want near a runway where planes can land in either direction.
After 9/11, unlock the pilot doors. The passengers will revolt against any attempted aircraft hijackings.
We need members of the public ready to help in a situation where a pilot goes crazy, and they can’t help with a locked door making it impossible for them to enter.
The solution is to "free" the perimeter of takeoff/landing. Bonus: People don't have to chose to work/live in these noisy areas. I understand some areas have challenges to come up with space but the US has tons of space and maybe the sea should be used to host these airports.
This is how almost all airports built in the last 50 years have worked. They were built way outside the cities. The cities grew to the airports.
More so, because of strong property rights it's very difficult to stop any development near the airports at all. The airport would have to buy up hundreds of square miles of land to prevent it at a staggering cost.
Lastly, one of the buildings that was hit was the UPS warehouse that stored goods to load on the plane. You want that as close as possible to the airport. Though right at the end of the runway is not the greatest place.
Consider the possibility that gigantic flying aluminum tubes filled with tons of flammable fuel hurtling around at hundreds of kilometers per hour comprise a dilemma that has no trivial answers. Even defining what "important thing" means at any given instant is not straightforward.
Unless you have a berm several dozen meters high with a 100 meter base, you ain't stopping something like this from a physics standpoint unfortunately.
Many airports have this problem. The recent korean air disaster which echos this is another example. BTW, this is why most airports, if possible, point out to sea...
Newer airports usually try to have space, that's the only thing helping with the physics involved here.
Older airports might have EMAS [1] retrofitted at the ends to help stop planes, but that's designed more for a landing plane not stopping quickly enough (like [2]) - not a plane trying to get airborne as in this case.
There is a dead zone between rejection and successful take-off speeds. We see it hit too often.
I think pilot training is playing a factor. A normal rotation kills too much energy. One engine can climb when you have some airspeed and get clean, but if you lose too much energy on rotation, the inefficiency of the AoA for the rest of the short flight means that engine can no longer buy you any up. I've seen too many single-engine planes going down while trying to pitch up the whole way down.
So, less aggressive single-engine rotations and energy absorbers at the ends of runways that can't get longer. This seems like the kind of thing where we do it because it removes a significant cause of people dying.
Another crash video shows the aircraft clearly descending before colliding with anything. It manages to go up a bit, so it's fast enough to get airborne. The normal looking rotation kills too much energy. The plane is then too inefficient to maintain speed. AoA goes up while energy goes down. Power available goes negative and then it's over.
Increased thrust requirements for airliners that force planes to hit an increased v1 (or whatever it's called) sooner on the runway to allow for more time to reject takeoff.
Rotation does increase drag, but you need to rotate in order to achieve the necessary angle of attack. The only way to reduce the rotation angle is by going faster than the normal rotation speed for the given weight and airfield density altitude, but doing so is out of the question in this scenario.
There might be other kinds of damage where the quicker altitude gain of a normal rotation is crucial for survival.
I'm skeptical whether pilots can realistically make this kind of decision, given that they have no more than a few seconds to make it, and in cases such as this based on very incomplete information about the state of their aircraft.
> It manages to go up a bit, so it's fast enough to get airborne. The normal looking rotation kills too much energy.
Yes, it did get airborne for a few seconds but from the video below, it looks like the left wing was damaged by the fire and could not provide enough lift, then the right wing rolled the plane to the left causing the crash.
> looks like the left wing was damaged by the fire
The wings and aerodynamics don't really care if air or air with combustion are flowing around them.
Roll is a consequence of the loss of control due to low speed and the yaw of the good engines. Speed up, rudder works, plane might maintain positive climb.
For skin, a few seconds might be significant. For the spars, not nearly enough time to matter. It's also not at cruise speed slamming into a downdraft or anything. This is about a 1G loading. Negligible for a while. While the fire looks cool, there's a lot of free stream mixing in and the temps won't really get that high beyond the cowling.
Some runways have been extended with ‘engineered materials’ surfaces, often a form of porous concrete into which an airliner’s wheels will sink, absorbing a lot of energy and arresting the airplane without causing it to break up. It is very effective for landing overruns, but I don’t know about last-seconds aborted takeoffs.
Security/debris fencing yes, but that's like, orders of magnitude short of what would stop the amount of energy we're talking about here.
You also don't particularly want it to be catastrophically effective as there are real world cases where planes have clipped the fence and then NOT gone on to crash, or at least to crash in a fairly controlled manner with the majority onboard surviving. Hitting a brick wall at 180mph is going to have a 0% survival rate.
Yet a reinforced concrete wall of e.g. triangular section and anchored with "long enough" piles would be about the only not-that-expensive way to turn a short strip of "airport land" past the EMAS into a V1 stopping supermarket.
It depends on whether or not, at the point in which you realize you have an engine on fire, you have room on the runway left to stop.
As I understand it, there is a low speed regime, under 80 knots, where are you stop for basically anything.
Then there is a high speed regime, where you only stop for serious issues, because you now have so much kinetic energy that stopping the plane, while still possible, will involve risk. (i.e. fire from overheated brakes.)
At a certain point, called V1, there’s no longer enough room to stop, no matter what your problem is. You’re either getting airborne or you’re crashing into whatever is ant the end of the runway. In general, getting airborne is the safer option, while obviously still not risk free.
However, this calculation also assumes that the engine fails in an isolated fashion, and its failure did not affect the other engines. If the failure of the left engine threw off debris that damaged the middle engine then we are now talking about a double engine failure. I’m sure the pilots knew there was a problem with the engine when they made the decision to continue, but it’s possible that problems with the middle engine weren’t apparent yet and that it only started to fail once they were committed.
Obviously, this is just speculation, and we will have to wait for the preliminary report at least.
Being untrained but spending a little bit of time in a full motion 737 simulator that’s used to train and certify commercial pilots, I was amazed at how quickly things happen even in a scenario with no faults.
This situation (single engine failure at V1) is something that commercial pilots are certified in at every recurrent certification since it’s one of the most difficult you can be in. The crew now need to climb and go around for a landing on one engine while simultaneously running through the engine failure (and also likely fire) checklist. I don’t know if a double engine failure at V1 on a fully loaded 3 engine aircraft is technically survivable or if it’s something that’s trained on. They were put in an incredibly difficult situation just based on what reports we’ve already seen.
I would be astounded if there was anything the pilots could have done to prevent this.
The plane was two engines out and a main fuel tank on fire, fully laden with a full fuel load. No amount of training or improvisation was going to fix that.
If anything it's lucky/professional they crashed into an industrial park and didn't have time for a go around. It would have been an even bigger disaster if they'd crashed into the town centre or a residential area.
V1 is the speed at which you can still stop the plane before the end of the runway. (It is computed for each takeoff based on runway length, aircraft mass, takeoff engine power setting, flaps, wind, runway condition, etc.)
When the plane reaches V1, pilots take the hand off the throttle: they're committed to takeoff, even if an engine fails. It is better to take off and fix the problem or land again, than to smash into whatever is beyond the end of the runway.
Isn't there any margin? Does it calculate stopping before end of runway or before causing damage?
Surely uncertainty about the situation contributes to defaulting to committing, but what if it's a passenger plane and at V1 pilots know they've lost power?
Wouldn't veering into highway at 30 mph be weighted against certain, big loss of life?
Edit: I now see that this has been partially answered by uncle comment
There is some margin in the calculations. But the training is very very clear, before V1 you must abort and after V1 you must continue. No discussion, no decision to make. You call V1, hands go off the throttles and no matter what you're going to fly.
The margin is for example that the plane must not just be able to fly, but also reach a minimum climb gradient to clear obstacles with a bit of safety margin. There is also an allowance for the time it takes from calling abort to actually hitting the brakes. And for example headwind is part of the calculation (it makes the takeoff distance shorter) but only 50% of the headwind is used in the calculations.
But all of those margins are not for the crew to use, the crew must just execute the procedure exactly as trained which means at V1 you're committed to continue the takeoff. And before V1 in case of an engine failure you have to hit the brakes to make sure you can stop before the end of the runway.
* Intensely * rude!
Or maybe I made a simple mistake of not studying this page up and down with keeping track of who writes what, nor checking GPs credentials.
I apologised in advance and asked a question, in a rather mild tone.
AI generally provides good quality answers, so with some goodwill you could even stretch this to be a compliment ;)
Finding oneself with the need to apologize in advance is an excellent hint to examine extra hard if you really should do what you're apologizing for. Apologizing when necessary is good, not having to apologize is much better.
It's a great level-up for characters of most alignments.
I did. By apologising and making a question, not accusation.
The commenter himself didn't seem hurt by it.
I'd recommend raising your outrage threshold.
I clearly am keeping this light hearted, while you go into fight mode because you saw the word "offence". Loosen up a bit :)
I see now that it probably wasn't, but "nothing" is an overstatement.
And knowledgeable and helpful responses can be AI, so there might be a fallacy somewhere in your offence-taking.
Are you offended when people do that in general, or only when they are wrong?
I do appreciate the effort put into writing a good comment.
> it probably wasn't, but "nothing" is an overstatement.
No, "nothing" seems perfectly accurate to me. I don't see even a single indication in tone, phrasing or punctuation that is a classic LLM giveaway.
It's offensive to standards of decency to question the authenticity of someone's speech, and it doesn't matter if you phrase it as a question or preface it with "excuse me if not". Unless there is really a strong reason to suspect something, which is absolutely not the case here. It's offensive when it's not warranted.
But regarding flight ability, wouldn't that be V2?
I thought there exist conditions where V1 is well below rotation speed.
Anyways,
> to make sure you can stop before the end of the runway
answers my main question, and makes sense from a procedural standpoint.
But still, hard to believe that there is no room for in-situ evaluation if runway overrun is worse than likely crash.
Of course then again, those have to be split second decisions.
V1 is the decision speed with respect to a single engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft. It's the speed below rotation speed at which the decision to abort safely can no longer be made.
Captains can make the decision to abort the takeoff in the case of absolute power loss or for 'failure to fly' (where the aircraft is clearly not going to fly, e.g. the elevator/pitch controls aren't responding). But the training is adamant: if you're uncertain what has happened after V1 you try to fly the plane away from the runway.
That's what I'm getting at. I want to abort unsafely. Imagine 400 meters of grass field after the end of the runway, and a water body. I'm asking wether such factors are accounted for, or if plane on ground beyond runway does-not-compute.
That "extra" 400m of grass? That's for all the other things that can still go wrong even when you follow procedure. e.g., you're below V1 so you abort takeoff, close throttles and hit the brakes. You should be able to safely stop on the runway.
But now your brakes fail because maybe the reason you had to abort was a fire that also managed to burn through your brake lines, or it started to rain just as you were taking off, or...
Now that's where the 400m of safety margin comes in to save your ass (hopefully). It's "extra", you don't plan on using it.
A fully loaded plane is extremely likely to turn into a fireball if it hits anything on the ground, even at 30mph. It's just a thin shell of aluminum with tons of fuel sloshing inside.
To avoid mass casualties at the end of the runway - on the road, or the buildings that the runway points to. Check the layout on google maps.
More specifically, V1 is the max speed at which you're about to take off, but you can still abort from. They hit that max speed and realized there was a major problem that hypothetically, they could have slowed down from, but realistically was not possible. They had no choice.
Work place related accidents always have a certain tragedy to them. Still remember when in the industrial park, my employer is located in, tanks belonging to a trash incinerator for special chemical waste exploded, taking several people with it.
>> highway and warehouses at the end of the runway
It's astonishing that this is a thing. Why aren't we building airports with enough space for a plane to remain on the ground and have plenty of room to decelerate in this situation? I can understand why it can't be retro fitted to existing airports but is it a scenario that's considered at new airports? Just seems like such an absolutely basic safety step.
> Why aren't we building airports with enough space for a plane to remain on the ground and have plenty of room to decelerate in this situation?
But that's exactly what a runway is? They're extremely long, have ample safety margins, and have "protected areas" extending out on either end, and regulations about what can and can't be built along the runway centerlines outside of those zones. But jetliners are huge, heavy, and fast, and catastrophes can happen at any phase of flight.
Yes, new major airports (rare as they are) do try to acquire large areas of land, larger even than they think they need now, in anticipation of future expansion. However, for scenarios like this, there's limited utility to making the runway longer "just in case." They already pick runway sizes "big enough and then some" as the minimum to even bring planes of each size to an airport. So there is margin.
But no matter the margin, a plane can always crash on the wrong side of any fence. And people will always build right up to wherever you put the fence as closer to the airport is more convenient for everything airport related.
Airports are usually built (originally) out in the boonies away from the major metro area. As time goes by and that land gets more valuable developers grease palms of politicians in land use commissions to allow developments closer and closer to the airports.
Airports also grow themselves. Some municipal airports sited for small aircraft extend their runways to handle larger planes.
This is probably the worst way a plane could go down. Maximum effect in term of damage. Cargo plane apparently reached V1 (go/no go speed) on the runway, and suffered a catastrophic engine failure. They passed V1, so they knew they were going down. Engine was shedding large debris, including the housing (!!!) which is a shrapnel shield.
They were on fire just as they reached V1.
Plane was fully loaded with 38,000 LB of fuel for 12 hour flight to hawaii. Worst case scenario.
Pilots did the heroic thing - they tried to take off instead of accelerate past the runway at ground level at 160 MPH to minimize collateral damage (highway and warehouses at the end of the runway) and crash and die somewhere else.
Instead, they clipped the UPS factory because they were so low, they tried to clear it but did not. Plane then hit the ground port wing down, shearing it off entirely, smearing a fireball of jet fuel across half a mile (not an exaggeration) before the plane flipped. Crew were likely dead by then, footage shows the cockpit being slammed into the ground by the flip once the port wing was gone and gravity took the starboard wing over.
Plane flipped, continued to smear half of the fuel load for another half a mile.
> They passed V1, so they knew they were going down.
To know this, they would have to know they had lost multiple engines. Clearly this is the case by the end, but it's not clear who realized what at what time.
There was more of an issue than just an engine being out. It looks like catastrophic damage to at least the left wing. So you have to now assume an engine out, reduced lift (if not a stall) on one wing, and likely no control surfaces responding on that wing.
I think this conversation has become completely divorced from my original criticism of OP's comment, which is that we don't know what the pilots knew before V1, at V1, after V1.
This really reminded me of a colleague who had a part-time night job flying cancelled checks from Centennial Airport (KAPA, south of Denver) to SLC. A bunch of us went out to lunch on a Friday in December 2005. That night, on his return to KAPA, he crashed his Mitsubishi MU-2 about a mile short of the runway. He and his co-pilot were gone, just like that. On Monday you could see the wreckage and cleanup from our office which was near the airport. It was so surreal.
KAPA is a beautiful airport too, and its restaurant "Perfect Landing" on the second-floor is S-tier. I've never heard about this case there, though. Do you have a flight number?
Early reports suggest the left engine separated during takeoff after maintenance work earlier that day. It’s a tragic reminder of how even small mechanical issues can turn catastrophic in seconds. Hope the NTSB can clarify what went wrong to prevent future accidents.
From wikipedia, Boeing stopped producing MD-11 since 2,000. Does that mean any MD-11 flying is at least 25 years old? I know 25-year is not particularly old for aircrafts, but MD-11 is not exactly reliable. Is there any reason UPS is flying these planes?
Airframes have a limited lifetime, partially defined by takeoffs and landings (and pressurization cycles). Cargo planes experience fewer cycles than passenger airlines since cargo carriers' aircraft usually only make a one or two flights a day, whereas passenger aircraft a flown back to back as frequently as possible. Historically, cargo carriers would buy used aircraft and convert them, but that's changing.
This particular aircraft was acquired by UPS in 2006 and converted for cargo missions. It was originally delivered as a passenger aircraft to Thai Airways International in 1991. [1] I actually saw this exact aircraft at RDU International in August of this year and took a photo, since tri-engine aircraft in general are not very common these days.
The gist is correct, but the subtleties are hiding in the details.
Wide-body (long-haul) airplanes are generally limited by flying hours since they rarely reach their maximum allowed flight cycles.
In contrast, wide-body cargo planes typically fly shorter legs compared to when they are used as passenger carriers. And as a result, they are much more likely to hit their critical cycle limit.
Relative of mine is a real estate agent in the Louisville area. This year she sold two homes to two UPS pilots. One of them, his first day was yesterday. The day of the crash. He was bumped from that very flight.
I didn’t realize the MD-11 was still in use. It has had a difficult time in passenger aviation.
Looks really nasty. It seems to have come down in an industrial area, which will significantly reduce casualties. I can’t even imagine this, in a residential area.
I had just seen and admired a UPS MD-11 making it's climbing turn after takeoff from ONT earlier that day. They are quite capable and a beautiful aircraft.
You really want an LLM hallucinating that everything is ok and turning your air back on? Or hallucinating that everything was always ok and not turning your air off in the first place?
the fact that stuff like this still happens (despite the relatively low probability/ incident rate) is truly mind boggling. the acceptability threshold for this need to be lower
that the engine tore off meakes the likelyhood of significant damage to critical flight control systems quite high, any such damage would have been asymetric and counteracting forces inducing a roll may have been impossible.
you know they tried
This is a silly take because having your ATC workers unpaid for over 30 days is going to increase the risk of catastrophic plane crashes. Even if this had nothing to do with this.
Footage of plane crashes are certainly important to know _this could start happening to passenger planes_
But was un-discoverable? Or un-preventable? Seems plane inspectors and safety-related roles were affected and have been furloughed:
> But for the people involved in inspecting our planes to ensure they follow Federal Aviation Administration safety standards, the situation is more complicated. While principal aviation inspectors were told to keep working, assistant-level inspectors and other support staff were sent home and then had to be recalled.
Of course it was not unpreventable, though it might turn out that preventing it would have been unreasonably expensive.
But, the FAA inspectors are not responsible for making sure planes are safe to fly. They are responsible for making sure the people whose job that actually is, are doing their jobs effectively. That’s a critical difference.
It’s UPS maintenance personnel who are responsible for making sure that UPS planes are safe to fly. Yes, it’s possible that there is some institutional failure at UPS, that could have been caught if FAA inspectors were working in the past 30 days, but this isn’t the most likely scenario, and the root cause and responsibility (in this hypothetical) would still lie with UPS and not the FAA and the shutdown.
Thats kind of insincere given how much safer flying is compared to driving a car. Modern flight is not dangerous, its just more spectacular when failures happen.
À lot of the reason why flying is so safe now is because of the culture of investigating every incident to make sure they won't happen again.
And, unfortunately, it's not that rare that the investigations to turn up things that were the result of corners being cut. I'm guessing that's what the "FAFO" comment points to.
And that has a lot to do with the said regulations. It is not safer because of magic or because flying in air was inherently safer then driving on ground.
Flying is only safer than driving a car when extremely regular and frequent maintenance is performed and performed correctly. The safety of flying goes down very fast when the maintenance effectiveness goes down. That is not true for cars.
Probably also worth pointing out that flying is only safer for Part 121 operators (airlines) -- private jets, sightseeing helicopters, skydiving operators, and general aviation are all more dangerous.
The maintenance and inspection tends to be done by MROs, and any institutional issue within UPS's MRO would have been identified before the shutdown by the FAA and other regulators.
But based on your comment history, you aren't from the US, have not ever visited America, do not care to visit America, and haven't interacted with Americans, so I doubt you have on the ground experience with the US. But that also leads to the question of why you even care to comment on our affairs if you dislike us to such a degree.
Another DC-10/MD-11 crash.
Does UPS perform their own engine maintenance, or do they outsource the work?
What is the effect of the recent layoff of 40,000 and the current cost-cutting project?
Maybe wait with the judgements until the report is in? There are so many possible reasons why this could have happened that have nothing to do with the two items you listed (though it maybe that it does, it is just a bit pointless to assign blame before you know what the cause of the accident was).
I mean the engine is laying on the side of the runway and the plane is seen on fire trying to take off; I'm going to go out on a limb and say maintenance was somehow involved.
You may well be right. Or... maybe there was a non-stress related manufacturing issue with a turbine blade. Maybe it ingested a bird, maybe it sucked in some crap lying on the runway. Maybe there as an issue with a part that was replaced during the 2 hour service just prior to the flight. Maybe there was an error during that service, or a defect that was overlooked. And a million other possibilities.
There has been at least one crash due to manufacturing defects that no one knew about beforehand or could therefore diagnose. We will find out what happened in about a year once the investigation is complete.
Phase of flight is a major contributor to accident statistics with take-off and landing much more often associated with accidents than the rest of the flight.
Take-off asks a lot from the engines, and one nasty bit about manufacturing defects is that they can take a while to show up, but the bulk of them usually surfaces when the aircraft are relatively new.
But: this plane was delayed before the flight due to maintenance on engine #1, so that's the first place where I would start looking for issues without any kind of judgment beforehand on what you would expect to find. And that's the main issue with that comment, it assumes a conclusion, that's not how these investigations work because then you might miss the actual cause. And given how critical these machines are it doesn't take much. All it takes is a single, tiny mistake.
The really bad luck here is that it seems as though the failure of engine #1 took the center engine right along with it. That's one of the issues with that particular design, if you have debris from one of the forward engines it could easily get ingested by the rear mounted one.
The last MD-11 crash with deaths was in 2009 and the last DC-10 kerfuffle was when their unapproved replacement parts fell on the runway and killed the Concorde. I wonder if flight 232 gave them a bad name - everybody seems to know that accident. Looks like have a good record otherwise.
The DC-10 was a rushed programme to avoid Douglas being frozen out of the 1970s widebody market by Lockheed and Boeing.
Similarly, the MD-11 was a cost-restricted update of the airframe to avoid McD being frozen out of the 1990s widebody market by Airbus and Boeing.
McD management wouldn't fund the more ambitious four-engined MD-12, so the trijet's fuselage was stretched and aerodynamic tweaks applied.
The MD-11 never met its performance targets and heralded the end of the Douglas commercial line. It was fairly quickly relegated from pax to cargo service where it has a good payload but little else to commend it.
Like a dash cam, they can save the footage only if there is a problem. Surely that would be much better than splicing together many third party camera recordings.
> Ground observers reported the aircraft had been delayed for about two hours for work on the left hand engine (engine #1), the engine #1 separated during the takeoff run, the center engine emitted streaks of flames, the aircraft impacted a UPS warehouse and ploughed through other facilities before coming to rest in a large plume of fire and smoke.
Best advice is always to wait for authoritative statements.
https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/669082-ups-md11...
My IP was blocked, for some reason.
So the tl'dr is: the leading very preliminary theory is that the MD-11's left engine fell off the wing just like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191 (a DC-10, the immediate predecessor of the MD-11) which was caused by maintenance errors weakening the pylon structure holding the engine.
1) improper maintenance—American Airlines had used a forklift shortcut to remove the engine and pylon together, rather than following McDonnell Douglas’s prescribed method
2) The detachment tore away part of the wing’s leading edge, rupturing hydraulic lines and severing electrical power to key systems, including the slat-position indicator and stall warning (stick shaker).
3) The pilots followed the standard engine-out procedure and reduced airspeed to V₂, which caused the aircraft to stall and roll uncontrollably left. This procedure was later found out to be incorrect.
Defective maintenance practices, inadequate oversight, vulnerabilities in DC-10 design, and unsafe training procedures combined to cause the crash, killing all 273 people on board and leading to sweeping reforms in airline maintenance and certification standards.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6iU7Mmf330
This can happen if you accelerated past V2 (V2+20 is normal) before the engine failure and then after the failure you slow down to V2 to get the best climb angle on a single engine plus some safety margins above stall etc.
It's hard for me to tell if this suggests a step backwards in application of the reforms instigated after AA191 or that those reforms were never copied over to cargo aviation.
Furthermore (and I don't know if this is related to the cause of this crash), cargo jets tend to be older/refurbished passenger planes that have outlived their useful lives flying passengers.
Exactly what happened in this case; the airplane was built in 1991 to carry passengers, and then converted in 2006 for freight.
https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/mcdonnell-douglas-md-...
(I do not mean to imply that this exact slat retraction is necessarily relevant in the Louisville crash, however - I believe aircraft since AA191 are designed to maintain their wing configuration after loss of hydraulic pressure.)
What strikes me as odd is that this looks like the "naked" engine, without the cowling/nacelle that usually surrounds it? Anyway, if an engine departs the aircraft shortly after (last-minute) maintenance was performed on it, that's indeed suspicious...
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/11/airplane-maintenance...
TDLR 10-20 years ago, the US started allowing maintenance of domestic planes in foreign countries, outside the reach of the FAA’s inspections
Ordinarily yes, but in this case there are reports that the plane underwent a "heavy maintenance check" from Sep 3 to Oct 18, which may have included engine removal and overhaul (source: pprune.org, from a poster who's not given to flights of fancy.)
Either way, to say it's "likely relevant" is a huge leap. We have no idea what caused the crash - it could be a million things and likely some combintation of them.
See also how FAA allowed Boeing to oversee its own certification for MAX.
The 737 Max crashes were also so frequently explained by online commenters as because of “outsourced software engineers” and so on.
But the FAA/NTSB always comes through with fact finding despite the immense political pressure to find these facile explanations. Organizationally, someone once designed these things well, and subsequently it has been preserved so well.
When I see so many American institutions turned to partisan causes through an escalation of “well, they’re doing it” it’s pretty wild that this org remains trustworthy. Wild.
Foreign Repair Stations date back to the 90s [1], the thing is they need to be supervised by an FAA Certified Mechanic. Inspection of these was already a hot issue in the early '00s... No one gave a fuck, it was all about saving costs for a very long time.
The linked 2007 report's second page (!) already leads with this:
> Since 2001, eight commercial air carriers have gone through bankruptcy and one has ceased operations. Fuel prices remain high, and this makes cost control a key factor in both the sustained profitability and overall survival of an airline.
IMHO, this is a perfect example why the government needs to regulate prices in safety-critical industries. The "race to the bottom" must be prevented - sorry, flying NYC-SFO for 70$, that's not sustainable.
[1] https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/Web_File_Foreign...
Aviation is one of the most regulated industries to the point where I've heard multiple aircraft maintenance people who don't know each other make quips to the tune of "we only cut the stupid corners because cutting the smart ones is illegal".
I'm not saying it should be less regulated but considering that the aircraft was maintained recently I wouldn't be surprised if some dumb "well you didn't say we couldn't do it" thing that isn't technically disallowed but should be covered under some broader "don't be stupid" rule was ultimately a causative factor.
The problem is, it doesn't work out that way. We lost enough people to that madness - as soon as hundreds, if not thousands (see 9/11) of lives are at stake, IMHO the effort to ensure compliance with standards is so massive, the government could (and should...) do the damn job itself.
Are you saying higher prices would lead to better safety?
If so, I think it's optimistic to assume that would be the result, rather than just more profits.
I'm all for tighter regulations and enforcement on safety and maintenance, though.
The industry (edit: planes in particular) is also decades more mature, as is manufacturing in general.
However, it's impossible to argue that deregulation made flying more dangerous, as the GP believes, simply because flying didn't become more dangerous. Sure, maybe we'd be even safer in the air if price deregulation hadn't happened, but that requires an impressive amount of handwaving. Overall, the tradeoff seems to have worked out incredibly well for everyone. The only people who are really in a position to object would be climate researchers.
Higher prices and regulations.
With no floor on pricing, there will always be enough greedy executives who are willing to cut corners to make money in a ruthlessly competitive environment, fully knowing that it is very hard to prosecute a C-level executive personally.
The other possible result will be that eventually the market "agrees upon" a minimum price floor while being in compliance to regulations - but that usually means that the company will be as bare-stripped of assets and reserves as possible, which means in turn that the slightest external shock can (and will) send not just one but multiple companies crashing down hard. We've seen this with Covid - an economy that has optimized itself for decades on running as lean as possible is very sensitive to all sorts of external interruptions. Of course, that's not directly relevant to safety... but indirectly it is, as the inevitable result of that is an oligo-, duo- or monopoly and then, we've seen with Boeing where that ends, incentives aligned too much to cut corners.
I think greed is what's causing cut corners.
You mention Boeing, and they were quite healthily profitable during the entire time they were cutting corners on the 737 MAX. Airbus wasn't an existential threat. It still isn't, in fact, even after all the fallout.
> I'm all for tighter regulations and enforcement on safety and maintenance, though.
That's from my first comment in this thread. I'm not sure what part of my comments make you think you should ask me that question.
What I'm arguing is against the notion that having minimum prices would fix said greed.
https://x.com/BNONews/status/1985845907191889930
https://xcancel.com/BNONews/status/1985845907191889930
Edit: just the mp4 https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1985845862409334784/pu/...
There is an incredible amount of ground damage! Just wow, this is very bad https://files.catbox.moe/3303ob.jpg
Scarily there are communities that have ignored such logic and permitted dense residential development right next to an airport.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palisades_del_Rey,_California
Burbank Airport has quiet hours and has left a bunch of commercially zoned area under that takeoff path.
I’m in Atlanta now and they bought up a lot of land around the airport when redeveloping it and do similar zoning tricks for the buffer. One of the buffer zones is the Porsche Experience. It’s loud as heck when you’re on the part of the track closest but not bad where the corporate HQ and paddock is
How many lives do the man hours spent commuting, or toiling away to afford higher rents waste?
IDK how the math pencils out, but an attempt ought to be made before drawing conclusions.
What generally gets areas in trouble is locations that used to be a good get worse as aircraft get larger and the surroundings get built up. The solution is to send larger airplanes to a new airport, but it’s not free and there’s no clear line when things get unacceptably dangerous.
https://maps.app.goo.gl/zhZdA5tWGAKunM2e8
(This is widely considered a misfeature of San Jose - it limits the height of buildings in downtown San Jose to 10 stories because the downtown is directly under the flight path of arriving flights, it limits runway length and airport expansion, and it means that planes and their noise fly directly over key tourist attractions like the Rose Garden and Convention Center. If we ever had a major plane crash like this one in San Jose it would be a disaster, because the airport is bounded by 101 on the north, 880 on the south, the arriving flight path goes right over downtown, and the departing flight path goes right over Levi's Stadium, Great America, and several office buildings.)
So while downtown being in the flight path is a risk there was some method to the madness which caused that alignment.
In addition, the terrain rises in both directions (so sharply on one side that planes can't use ILS when landing from that direction).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midway_International_Airport
It's hard to project growth. Things build right up to the limit of the airport for convenient access, then the area grows and the airport needs to grow - and what do you do? Seattle-Tacoma is critically undersized for the traffic it gets and has been struggling with the fact that there's physically nowhere to expand to.
Obviously you’re better off making such decisions early rather than building a huge airport only to abandon it. Thus it’s called urban planning not urban triage.
My magic crystal ball named "the past 50yr of history" says it is unlikely to be the success you envision.
That works in costal areas, but not inland.
There's no large body of water near the Louisville airport.
But also there's a lot of urban and suburban development you'd have to displace to even consider moving the airport near the Ohio River for most miles both up and down stream of Louisville.
As to a crash, ditching into an industrial area isn’t significantly worse for the passengers than ditching into a set of rapids, but the rapids are far better for the general public.
Ever see Dallas Love Field?
https://maps.app.goo.gl/A94EdexYwfpyeMxa7
Lots of airports are pretty much immediately adjacent to their city centers.
Queens, NY has entered the chat…
You’re correct, but at least LaGuardia airport generally has takeoffs over water.
LaGuardia aircraft landings may happen over dense apartment buildings, but less likely for catastrophic damage (glide path, less fuel, engines are <10% throttle, etc)
Flying with two engines and taking off without an engine in a loaded aircraft are two very different things. A lot more thrust is needed during takeoff than after.
In fact, it being normal almost certainly contributed to the scale of this accident, since a single engine failure during the takeoff roll isn't considered enough of an emergency to reject the takeoff at high speed (past a certain speed, you only abort if the aircraft is literally unflyable - for everything else, you take the aircraft & emergency into the air and figure it out there). The crew wouldn't have had any way to know that one of their engines had not simply failed, but was straight-up gone with their wing on fire to boot.
I don't know about the MD-11 itself, but other aircraft from that time period have sensors to detect and report overheat and fire in various parts of the aircraft, including engines and wings.
There's also a very big difference between "Engine failure: something has damaged or jammed enough components that the turbines are no longer spinning fast enough to produce thrust or drive the generators" and "Engine failure: the engine is no longer attached to the aircraft, which is why it is no longer producing thrust". However, both things are reported in the cockpit as ENG FAIL.
(Un)fortunately, cockpit warnings prioritise the what (so to speak) and not the how or why. On one hand, this makes decision-making a lot simpler for the crew, but on the other...well, in rare cases the lack of insight can exacerbate a disaster. Depending on when exactly the engine gave out, this poor crew might have been doomed either way, but they might have been able to minimise collateral damage if they knew just how badly crippled the aircraft was. And there was a very similar accident to this one (actually involving the predecessor of the MD-11, the DC-10), American Airlines 191 - one of the engines detached from the aircraft, damaging the leading edge of its wing in the process, causing that wing to stall when the crew slowed down below the stall speed of the damaged wing in a bid to climb. If they could have somehow known about the damage, the accident might have been avoided entirely as the crew might have known to keep their speed up.
What is the difference?
Edit: and damage to other engines, possibly engine #2 in the tail ingesting debris in this instance.
Cut fuel & hydraulic lines near that engine (that affect the other engines/ apus) (or less likely structural or aerodynamic problems) is what's going to shift this from "engine failure" recoverable problem to a global nonrecoverable one.
and
"I can't walk because I have no legs"
Wanting to be in the air vs wanting to over-run the end of the runway.
In emergencies, information overload tends to make things worse, not better.
And now we have technology that allows for cameras everywhere to give a better situational awareness across all critical aircraft surfaces and systems.
It is going to take a little bit of adjusting to, but it will help improve safety in a tremendous way.
And how would the cameras even work? Are the pilots supposed to switch between multiple camera feeds, or do we install dozens of screens? And then what, they see lots of black smoke on one camera, does that really tell them that much more than the ENG FIRE alert blaring in the background?
Maybe this could help during stable flight, but in this situation, when the pilots were likely already overloaded and probably had only a few seconds to escape this situation - if it was possible at all - I can't imagine it being helpful.
If we don't try to see how it goes, we won't know if it is a good idea or not.
It'd take lots of testing and engineering. But especially in cases where you have multiple warnings going off I imagine that a quick view at an exterior camera can often give you a clearer/faster indication of the situation
Helpful in what way? What are the pilots going to do with the information?
the problem might be getting trained and experienced pilots to adjust to it since they are already in a certain flow of habits and skills to apply in their job, but new pilots surely could learn it as they aren't so set on their ways yet and have the opportunity to build this new data into their skillset / habits.
People have an upper limit on their capacity to take in information, and that limit goes down when they are moving quickly to solve problems. Throwing more information at them in those moments increases the risk that they will take in the wrong information, disregard more important information, and make really bad decisions.
So no, it's not cut and dried like you're thinking.
This is consuming all mental processing, there are no spare cycles.
This wasn’t a salvageable situation by having more information after the engine separated. If a sensor could have provided a warning of engine failure well before V1, that would be helpful.
I expect the questions will focus on what information existed that should have resulted in aborting the takeoff. Not what information was needed to continue.
> see UA1175
I'm familiar with the case you are mentioning. I'm also aware that they sent a jump seater to look at the engine. But did seeing the engine provide them with any actionable information? Did they fly the airplane differently than if they would have just seen the indications available in the cockpit?
Stupid car analogy: airbags help in most cases, but not all. Are they useless?
Regarding UA1175, they had someone extra, but not all flights happen to have someone extra in the cockpit.
Excellent. So in what cases does seeing the engine visually do help? So far we discussed UPS2976 and UA1175 where the presence or absence of the camera didn't change the outcome.
> Regarding UA1175, they had someone extra, but not all flights happen to have someone extra in the cockpit.
You are dancing around my question. What does the pilot do differently based on what they see? If you can't articulate a clear "pilot sees X they do Y, pilot sees Z they do Q" flow then what is the video good for?
in a sibling thread you say "There are countless situations where it can be helpful." But you haven't named even one of those countless situations yet.
Now... not sure how much that is helpful in this kind of emergency, they really didn't have time to do much.
There are two fire detection loops for each engine.[1] Even if both fails (because they get shredded as you say it) the system will report an engine fire if the two loops fail within 5s of each other. (Or FIRE DET (1,2,3,or APU) FAIL, if they got shredded with more than 5s in between without any fire indications in between.)
The detection logic is implemented directly below the cockpit. So that unlikely to have shredded at the same time. But even if the detection logic would have died that would also result in a fire alarm. (as we learned from the March 31, 2002 Charlotte incident.)[2]
In other words it is a very reliable system.
1: page 393 https://randomflightdatabase.fr/Documents/Manuel%20Aviation/...
2: https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/dvdfiles/US/2002-03-31...
[1] https://www.avherald.com/h?article=4dfd50b9&opt=0%20
In this case however, with the wing already on fire (the engine is below the wing, so flames coming out of it would be visible behind and under the wing, not in front), I'm afraid that even if they had managed to take off, the fuel tank would have exploded or burned through the wing before they would have had a chance to land. Actually, this looks similar to the 2000 Concorde crash...
https://imgur.com/a/NYlrLYO
https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/757091156717862935/14...
Source: https://reddit.com/r/flying/comments/1ooms7t/ksdf_accident/n...
In fact, for awhile (maybe still the case), the #1 killer of skydivers was single engine failure on takeoff from the jump plane (and similar aircraft failures), not accidents ‘while skydiving’.
Freeze frame: https://imgur.com/a/c3h8Qd3
The rotation already exacerbates the flow into that engine. Change in flow geometry gets more smoke in its way when it's already eating turbulent air.
We don't know if it just had a disruption or a full-blown stall, but give the way it made it to takeoff speed and then just gave out, stall seems likely.
Obviously impossible to tell from some cell phone type videos. Being struck by something is also possible. But it sure does look like an uncontained engine failure.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45818448
https://www.wdrb.com/news/ups-plane-catches-fire-and-explode...
> There is an incredible amount of ground damage!
It's fortunate it wasn't taking off the other direction, towards the adjacent downtown of Louisville (https://www.google.com/maps/place/Louisville+International+A...)
https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/UPS2976
Every time I board a plane, I think what a crazy thing I am doing, but then I remember that I could be safe and snug in my house and still be in a plane crash.
To be fair, statistically, your living room is far more dangerous than the cabin of an airplane.
I doubt there's a good source of data, but I'd be very curious what the odds of dying in your living room per hour are if you exclude those categories and look at things like house fires, natural disasters, homicide, freak accidents (like planes falling on your house), etc.
In contrast, the United States saw 125,700 preventable deaths in the home in 2023.[3] The country had a population of 336,806,231 people back then.[4] This means a probability of approx 1:2,679 (0.037 %).
[1] ATAG Aviation Beyond Borders 2024
[2] ICAO Safety Report 2024 Edition
[3] National Safety Council (NSC) Injury Facts
[4] World Bank
By these metrics commercial flying isn't as safe as you think.
Is there actual reason to think they are less safe per hour of time being spend in them as OP claimed?
- Most people don't fly often enough to justify Statistics significance (I for one only flied maybe less than 10 flights in my whole life)
- One flight is going to cover a huge amount of mileage anyway
Edit: Just realized that issue 1 is not an issue, we are going to do an average here anyway, so not individual.
The vast majority of deaths by train involve "trespassers", which is code for "dimwits who bypassed crossing gates and got smashed by the train that couldn't stop". Usually not even the train drivers are injured, much less the passengers.
But airplanes are very safe - perhaps mostly because it's hard for idiots to drive in front of them.
It's code for suicide. The remainder are as you described.
First, you are correct about trespassers. But even if you only consider passengers, planes are still safer per passenger-mile than trains.
Second, commercial planes are very safe. Private planes... not in the same league.
All things being equal, I would assume that you are safer in an environment that's stationary and reasonably sturdy, rather than in an aluminum tube at 40,000 ft above ground? Ok, as they say, all things are rarely equal, of course people are more likely to die of old age or of various diseases at home rather than while traveling (simply because old and terminally ill people probably don't travel that much), but I would say that skews the statistics against the living room and should be discounted. And at home you can engage in various activities that you probably won't do while on an airplane (electrical repairs, cooking...), but if you get hurt while doing that, that's also not a fault of the living room per se...
Would you be safer in your living room doing nothing, strapped to a seat, never doing anything remotely hazardous (like walking around), vs the same in a tube in the sky? Yes, of course. But that's not what people actually DO in their living rooms!
Contributing factors:
- Prolonged immobility, which causes blood to pool in the legs
- Low cabin pressure and dehydration from the dry cabin air
Micromorts, maybe? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micromort
Background risk of death from non-natural causes are listed as 1.6 per day; many of those non-natural causes do not exist in an airplane cabin (e.g. you probably aren't going to be murdered because no one has anything more effective than a plastic spork, you probably aren't going to kill yourself, you probably won't be hit by a car). So it seems reasonable to say that being inside an airliner cabin is safer than being outside of one.
Also, this is probably confounded by many super-old or super-sick people not choosing to fly - if you are in an airliner, you are probably healthier than the average person.
Except for the occasional murder who has access to the flight controls.
According to Garp, you just need to buy a pre-disastered home. You'll be safe there.[^1]
(Unfortunately his logic is flawed.[^2])
[^1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3TuoGVNbBs
[^2]: https://xkcd.com/795/
They were on fire just as they reached V1.
Plane was fully loaded with 38,000 LB of fuel for 12 hour flight to hawaii. Worst case scenario.
Pilots did the heroic thing - they tried to take off instead at 160 MPH to minimize collateral damage (highway and warehouses at the end of the runway) and crash and die somewhere else, instead of go beyond the runway at that speed. Accelerating a fully loaded jet plane at ground level beyond the runway has obvious consequences. They had one choice.
Instead, they clipped the UPS factory because they were so low, they tried to clear it but did not. Plane then hit the ground port wing down, shearing it off entirely, smearing a fireball of jet fuel across half a mile (not an exaggeration) before the plane flipped. Crew were likely dead by before this, footage shows the cockpit being slammed into the ground like a mousetrap by the flip once the port wing was gone and gravity took the starboard wing over.
Physics took over. Plane flipped and rolled upon loss of port wing, smearing a rolling fireball of the remaining fuel load from the starboard wing for another half a mile.
Louisville is now a firestorm as a result.
Respect to the flight crew; rest in peace, they made the best they could out of a really shitty scenario. They flew it all the way down.
Footage:
https://x.com/osinttechnical/status/1985845987684855969?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985849267152699741?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985848132500885995?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985843126934614297?s=46
As far as the rest of my comment - watch the videos that I linked.
After V1 you must be able to take off on only the remaining engines. If that's not possible you must reduce weight until it is possible or you're not allowed to start takeoff at all.
This is why in very warm weather and higher altitude airports (lower performance) sometimes cargo/luggage or even some passengers are left behind, while in colder weather all seats could be used.
Let's leave that word to mean what it actually means. Louisville experienced a serious fire.
Do runways have some sort of barrier between them and the next "important" thing. It seems like that would be prudent both for cases like this, and breaking failures following landings.
Ha, Jeju Air Flight 2216 smashed into a barrier on the second landing attempt in Muan last year [0], and people commented "How could there be a barrier at the end of the runway, so obviously stupid, irresponsible", etc.
Now a plane does not smash into a barrier at the end of the runway and people suggest putting barriers at the end of the runway.
Don't mean to attack parent post, but may I suggest that
a) hordes of experts have thought long and hard about these issues, and it is unlikely that you can encounter this for the first time as a lay person and come up with a solution that has eluded the best engineers for decades ("why don't they attach a parachute to the plane?"), and
b) we are very close to an optimum in commercial aviation, and there are few if any unambiguous ("Pareto") improvements, but rather just tradeoffs. For example: You leave cockpit doors open, terrorists come in and commandeer the plane to turn it into a weapon. You lock the cockpit doors closed, and suicidal pilots lock out the rest of the crew and commandeer the plane to turn it into a weapon of mass-murder-suicide.
There are no easy answers.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeju_Air_Flight_2216
ETA: In 2007 an A320 overran a runway in Brazil and crashed into a gas station, killing 187 pax & crew + 12 on the ground. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TAM_Airlines_Flight_3054
from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214
We need members of the public ready to help in a situation where a pilot goes crazy, and they can’t help with a locked door making it impossible for them to enter.
More so, because of strong property rights it's very difficult to stop any development near the airports at all. The airport would have to buy up hundreds of square miles of land to prevent it at a staggering cost.
Lastly, one of the buildings that was hit was the UPS warehouse that stored goods to load on the plane. You want that as close as possible to the airport. Though right at the end of the runway is not the greatest place.
Some do. Here is what it looks like when an overshooting plane utilizes such a barrier: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zW71FrX8t_g
179 dead.
Consider the possibility that gigantic flying aluminum tubes filled with tons of flammable fuel hurtling around at hundreds of kilometers per hour comprise a dilemma that has no trivial answers. Even defining what "important thing" means at any given instant is not straightforward.
Arrestor beds exist, and given enough space a fully loaded plane at take-off velocity can be stopped in a controlled and safe way.
Cost and space are often the reason why this does not happen.
Many airports have this problem. The recent korean air disaster which echos this is another example. BTW, this is why most airports, if possible, point out to sea...
Older airports might have EMAS [1] retrofitted at the ends to help stop planes, but that's designed more for a landing plane not stopping quickly enough (like [2]) - not a plane trying to get airborne as in this case.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engineered_materials_arrestor_... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southwest_Airlines_Flight_1248
I think pilot training is playing a factor. A normal rotation kills too much energy. One engine can climb when you have some airspeed and get clean, but if you lose too much energy on rotation, the inefficiency of the AoA for the rest of the short flight means that engine can no longer buy you any up. I've seen too many single-engine planes going down while trying to pitch up the whole way down.
So, less aggressive single-engine rotations and energy absorbers at the ends of runways that can't get longer. This seems like the kind of thing where we do it because it removes a significant cause of people dying.
Just watched this angle a few more times: https://x.com/BNONews/status/1985845907191889930
Another crash video shows the aircraft clearly descending before colliding with anything. It manages to go up a bit, so it's fast enough to get airborne. The normal looking rotation kills too much energy. The plane is then too inefficient to maintain speed. AoA goes up while energy goes down. Power available goes negative and then it's over.
I'm skeptical whether pilots can realistically make this kind of decision, given that they have no more than a few seconds to make it, and in cases such as this based on very incomplete information about the state of their aircraft.
Yes, it did get airborne for a few seconds but from the video below, it looks like the left wing was damaged by the fire and could not provide enough lift, then the right wing rolled the plane to the left causing the crash.
https://bsky.app/profile/shipwreck75.bsky.social/post/3m4tvh...
The wings and aerodynamics don't really care if air or air with combustion are flowing around them.
Roll is a consequence of the loss of control due to low speed and the yaw of the good engines. Speed up, rudder works, plane might maintain positive climb.
Not saying it's what happened here, but if the heat is intense enough to deform the wing / control surfaces, it matters.
You also don't particularly want it to be catastrophically effective as there are real world cases where planes have clipped the fence and then NOT gone on to crash, or at least to crash in a fairly controlled manner with the majority onboard surviving. Hitting a brick wall at 180mph is going to have a 0% survival rate.
As I understand it, there is a low speed regime, under 80 knots, where are you stop for basically anything.
Then there is a high speed regime, where you only stop for serious issues, because you now have so much kinetic energy that stopping the plane, while still possible, will involve risk. (i.e. fire from overheated brakes.)
At a certain point, called V1, there’s no longer enough room to stop, no matter what your problem is. You’re either getting airborne or you’re crashing into whatever is ant the end of the runway. In general, getting airborne is the safer option, while obviously still not risk free.
However, this calculation also assumes that the engine fails in an isolated fashion, and its failure did not affect the other engines. If the failure of the left engine threw off debris that damaged the middle engine then we are now talking about a double engine failure. I’m sure the pilots knew there was a problem with the engine when they made the decision to continue, but it’s possible that problems with the middle engine weren’t apparent yet and that it only started to fail once they were committed.
Obviously, this is just speculation, and we will have to wait for the preliminary report at least.
RIP
This situation (single engine failure at V1) is something that commercial pilots are certified in at every recurrent certification since it’s one of the most difficult you can be in. The crew now need to climb and go around for a landing on one engine while simultaneously running through the engine failure (and also likely fire) checklist. I don’t know if a double engine failure at V1 on a fully loaded 3 engine aircraft is technically survivable or if it’s something that’s trained on. They were put in an incredibly difficult situation just based on what reports we’ve already seen.
The plane was two engines out and a main fuel tank on fire, fully laden with a full fuel load. No amount of training or improvisation was going to fix that.
If anything it's lucky/professional they crashed into an industrial park and didn't have time for a go around. It would have been an even bigger disaster if they'd crashed into the town centre or a residential area.
Not on the MD-11, anyway.
When the plane reaches V1, pilots take the hand off the throttle: they're committed to takeoff, even if an engine fails. It is better to take off and fix the problem or land again, than to smash into whatever is beyond the end of the runway.
Surely uncertainty about the situation contributes to defaulting to committing, but what if it's a passenger plane and at V1 pilots know they've lost power? Wouldn't veering into highway at 30 mph be weighted against certain, big loss of life?
Edit: I now see that this has been partially answered by uncle comment
The margin is for example that the plane must not just be able to fly, but also reach a minimum climb gradient to clear obstacles with a bit of safety margin. There is also an allowance for the time it takes from calling abort to actually hitting the brakes. And for example headwind is part of the calculation (it makes the takeoff distance shorter) but only 50% of the headwind is used in the calculations.
But all of those margins are not for the crew to use, the crew must just execute the procedure exactly as trained which means at V1 you're committed to continue the takeoff. And before V1 in case of an engine failure you have to hit the brakes to make sure you can stop before the end of the runway.
I apologised in advance and asked a question, in a rather mild tone.
AI generally provides good quality answers, so with some goodwill you could even stretch this to be a compliment ;)
It's a great level-up for characters of most alignments.
The commenter himself didn't seem hurt by it.
I'd recommend raising your outrage threshold. I clearly am keeping this light hearted, while you go into fight mode because you saw the word "offence". Loosen up a bit :)
And knowledgeable and helpful responses can be AI, so there might be a fallacy somewhere in your offence-taking. Are you offended when people do that in general, or only when they are wrong?
I do appreciate the effort put into writing a good comment.
No, "nothing" seems perfectly accurate to me. I don't see even a single indication in tone, phrasing or punctuation that is a classic LLM giveaway.
It's offensive to standards of decency to question the authenticity of someone's speech, and it doesn't matter if you phrase it as a question or preface it with "excuse me if not". Unless there is really a strong reason to suspect something, which is absolutely not the case here. It's offensive when it's not warranted.
But regarding flight ability, wouldn't that be V2? I thought there exist conditions where V1 is well below rotation speed.
Anyways,
> to make sure you can stop before the end of the runway
answers my main question, and makes sense from a procedural standpoint.
But still, hard to believe that there is no room for in-situ evaluation if runway overrun is worse than likely crash. Of course then again, those have to be split second decisions.
Captains can make the decision to abort the takeoff in the case of absolute power loss or for 'failure to fly' (where the aircraft is clearly not going to fly, e.g. the elevator/pitch controls aren't responding). But the training is adamant: if you're uncertain what has happened after V1 you try to fly the plane away from the runway.
That's what I'm getting at. I want to abort unsafely. Imagine 400 meters of grass field after the end of the runway, and a water body. I'm asking wether such factors are accounted for, or if plane on ground beyond runway does-not-compute.
That "extra" 400m of grass? That's for all the other things that can still go wrong even when you follow procedure. e.g., you're below V1 so you abort takeoff, close throttles and hit the brakes. You should be able to safely stop on the runway.
But now your brakes fail because maybe the reason you had to abort was a fire that also managed to burn through your brake lines, or it started to rain just as you were taking off, or...
Now that's where the 400m of safety margin comes in to save your ass (hopefully). It's "extra", you don't plan on using it.
Between V1, Rotate and V2, there’s like a 2-3kts difference (between each of them).
I am not familiar what the procedure is if you have dual-engine failure at or above V1.
More specifically, V1 is the max speed at which you're about to take off, but you can still abort from. They hit that max speed and realized there was a major problem that hypothetically, they could have slowed down from, but realistically was not possible. They had no choice.
Work place related accidents always have a certain tragedy to them. Still remember when in the industrial park, my employer is located in, tanks belonging to a trash incinerator for special chemical waste exploded, taking several people with it.
It's astonishing that this is a thing. Why aren't we building airports with enough space for a plane to remain on the ground and have plenty of room to decelerate in this situation? I can understand why it can't be retro fitted to existing airports but is it a scenario that's considered at new airports? Just seems like such an absolutely basic safety step.
But that's exactly what a runway is? They're extremely long, have ample safety margins, and have "protected areas" extending out on either end, and regulations about what can and can't be built along the runway centerlines outside of those zones. But jetliners are huge, heavy, and fast, and catastrophes can happen at any phase of flight.
But no matter the margin, a plane can always crash on the wrong side of any fence. And people will always build right up to wherever you put the fence as closer to the airport is more convenient for everything airport related.
Airports also grow themselves. Some municipal airports sited for small aircraft extend their runways to handle larger planes.
They were on fire just as they reached V1.
Plane was fully loaded with 38,000 LB of fuel for 12 hour flight to hawaii. Worst case scenario.
Pilots did the heroic thing - they tried to take off instead of accelerate past the runway at ground level at 160 MPH to minimize collateral damage (highway and warehouses at the end of the runway) and crash and die somewhere else.
Instead, they clipped the UPS factory because they were so low, they tried to clear it but did not. Plane then hit the ground port wing down, shearing it off entirely, smearing a fireball of jet fuel across half a mile (not an exaggeration) before the plane flipped. Crew were likely dead by then, footage shows the cockpit being slammed into the ground by the flip once the port wing was gone and gravity took the starboard wing over.
Plane flipped, continued to smear half of the fuel load for another half a mile.
Louisville is now a firestorm as a result.
Footage:
https://x.com/osinttechnical/status/1985845987684855969?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985849267152699741?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985848132500885995?s=46
https://x.com/faytuksnetwork/status/1985843126934614297?s=46
To know this, they would have to know they had lost multiple engines. Clearly this is the case by the end, but it's not clear who realized what at what time.
The NTSB investigation will bring more light.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45818462
Oh I guess it was 2004, not 2005.
Yes, Perfect Landing is a great restaurant!
[1]: https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flight-tracking-news/majo...
Wide-body (long-haul) airplanes are generally limited by flying hours since they rarely reach their maximum allowed flight cycles.
In contrast, wide-body cargo planes typically fly shorter legs compared to when they are used as passenger carriers. And as a result, they are much more likely to hit their critical cycle limit.
It seems like it happened fairly late in the sequence. Not sure how much of a difference it would have made.
- Shirley Jackson
Looks really nasty. It seems to have come down in an industrial area, which will significantly reduce casualties. I can’t even imagine this, in a residential area.
40+ people died in that one, it's a miracle it wasn't more.
Excellent edge-case for IFTTT thermostat. Localized air quality alert --> Intake offline.
Footage of plane crashes are certainly important to know _this could start happening to passenger planes_
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flight-tracking-news/majo...
But was un-discoverable? Or un-preventable? Seems plane inspectors and safety-related roles were affected and have been furloughed:
> But for the people involved in inspecting our planes to ensure they follow Federal Aviation Administration safety standards, the situation is more complicated. While principal aviation inspectors were told to keep working, assistant-level inspectors and other support staff were sent home and then had to be recalled.
https://archive.ph/rEpTx
But, the FAA inspectors are not responsible for making sure planes are safe to fly. They are responsible for making sure the people whose job that actually is, are doing their jobs effectively. That’s a critical difference.
It’s UPS maintenance personnel who are responsible for making sure that UPS planes are safe to fly. Yes, it’s possible that there is some institutional failure at UPS, that could have been caught if FAA inspectors were working in the past 30 days, but this isn’t the most likely scenario, and the root cause and responsibility (in this hypothetical) would still lie with UPS and not the FAA and the shutdown.
And, unfortunately, it's not that rare that the investigations to turn up things that were the result of corners being cut. I'm guessing that's what the "FAFO" comment points to.
But based on your comment history, you aren't from the US, have not ever visited America, do not care to visit America, and haven't interacted with Americans, so I doubt you have on the ground experience with the US. But that also leads to the question of why you even care to comment on our affairs if you dislike us to such a degree.
"I'm just asking questions."
Well-maintained planes don't do that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_Airways_Flight_1549
Once an engine breaks the question is whether or not it becomes unbalanced, that is one reason why they can become detached from the plane.
Take-off asks a lot from the engines, and one nasty bit about manufacturing defects is that they can take a while to show up, but the bulk of them usually surfaces when the aircraft are relatively new.
But: this plane was delayed before the flight due to maintenance on engine #1, so that's the first place where I would start looking for issues without any kind of judgment beforehand on what you would expect to find. And that's the main issue with that comment, it assumes a conclusion, that's not how these investigations work because then you might miss the actual cause. And given how critical these machines are it doesn't take much. All it takes is a single, tiny mistake.
The really bad luck here is that it seems as though the failure of engine #1 took the center engine right along with it. That's one of the issues with that particular design, if you have debris from one of the forward engines it could easily get ingested by the rear mounted one.
Similarly, the MD-11 was a cost-restricted update of the airframe to avoid McD being frozen out of the 1990s widebody market by Airbus and Boeing.
McD management wouldn't fund the more ambitious four-engined MD-12, so the trijet's fuselage was stretched and aerodynamic tweaks applied.
The MD-11 never met its performance targets and heralded the end of the Douglas commercial line. It was fairly quickly relegated from pax to cargo service where it has a good payload but little else to commend it.